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SYNCHRONIZING DEDUCTIBLE TAXES
AND TAXABLE INCOME
ROBERT HANES GRAY*T HE fundamental importance of correct timing in the computa-
tion of annual income is generally recognized. Any business
activity continuing over a period longer than that under obser-
vation involves a flow of revenue and a flow of expense which must be
carefully matched., If this is not done, provisional estimates2 may give a
highly distorted picture of the operations of an enterprise.3 Fortunately,
in calculating periodic gain a considerable part of the expense and revenue
is so closely related to the period for which the estimate is made that there
is, no serious dispute as to its proper allocation. The difficulties of match-
ing are caused by the items which are also identifiable with preceding or
subsequent periods or which are not readily identifiable with any particu-
lar time.4 In part these difficulties may be overcome by using accepted
accounting guides to allocate revenue and expense to the appropriate
year. However, there remains a broad area of doubt and uncertainty
where the guides or their application are controverted; consequently esti-
mates of annual income may vary measurably even though made by per-
sons of experienced judgment. s
Yet in spite of the wide variations in income estimates the need for
timely reports has compelled more frequent sampling than that afforded
by the annual statement.6 In addition, even the annual report is being
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
'See Paton and Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards i5 (i94o).
2 "All measures of income for periods less than the total lapse of time during a relationship
or less than the duration of an enterprise are approximate indexes only." Canning, The Eco-
nomics of Accountancy 124 (1929).
3 Simons, Personal Income Taxation 5o (1938).
4 See Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore, A Statement of Accounting Principles 25-26 (1938).
5 Blough, Accounting Principles Interpreted in Light of Recent Developments, 12 J. of Bus.
of Univ. Chi. 265 (1939); Scott, Responsibilities of Accountants in a Changing Economy, i4
Accounting Rev. 396, 400, 401 (1939); Berle, Accounting and the Law, 65 J. of Accountancy
368 (1938); Sanders, The Development of Accounting Principles, io Accounting Rev. ioo
(1935); May, Uniformity in Accounting, 17 Harv. Bus. Rev. 1 (938); Greer, What Are Ac-
cepted Principles of Accounting?, 13 Accounting Rev. 25 (1938).
6 See Porter and Fiske, Accounting i4x (i.35); Paton, Essentials of Accounting 356 (x938).
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used for purposes other than those for which it was originally intended.7
The income tax, of course, furnishes but one example of this practice.8 Un-
like the uses originally made of such reports, their use as the basis for in-
come tax assessment gives direct and tangible effect to conclusions which
are admittedly nothing more than estimates--conclusions which fre-
quently are not taken at their face value, but which are used merely in
connection with other significant evidence."° It is one thing to compute
earnings for the purpose of indicating to creditors, owners, and managers
the general progress of a business; it is quite another to make the same
estimate and then be compelled to pay a large part of it to the Federal
Government. Certainly the customary accuracies of matching which are
deemed both elementary and essential when making estimates for business
purposes should be necessary a fortiori when computing taxable income.
In the zone where individual opinion plays such a large part (as, for
example, where contingency reserves are involved) it is only to be ex-
pected that, when providing for the collection of the income tax, the
Government will insist upon practices which will protect its revenue.""
7 For some of the law-accounting problems of one agency alone see Sanders, Accounting
Aspects of the Securities Act, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. i9 (1937); Kaplan and Reaugh,
Accounting, Reports to Stockholders, and the SEC, 48 Yale L. J. g35 (z939); MacChesney,
The Securities and Exchange Commission's Development of Accounting Standards, 26 Calif.
L. Rev. 349 (1938); Securities Legislation-Accounting Practice and the Securities Act of
1933, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 288 (1938); Accounting Principles and Auditing Responsibilities
Established under the Securities Acts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 820 (1939); Selected Problems in Valu-
ing Assets under the Securities Act, 25 Iowa L. Rev. io5 (1939); Greidinger, What Has the
S.E.C. to Offer the Tax Accountant?, i8 Taxes 477 (i94o); see also Kripke, Accountants'
Financial Statement and Fact-finding in the Law of Corporate Regulation, 5o Yale L. J.
II80 (1941).
9 It has been said, however, that the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment was "the great-
est forward impulse the science and the profession of accountancy has ever received in this
country." Meyer, The Income Tax-Accounting Aspects, 3 Accounting Rev. 18 (1928).
While there has been an unfortunate tendency to keep books in conformity with the require-
ments of the Treasury Department instead of shaping accounting practices to the needs
of business, Isaacs, Review of Graham and Katz, Accounting in Law Practice, 28111. L. Rev.
440 (1933); Blough, op. cit. supra note 5, at 269-70, there has been, nevertheless, a decided im-
provement in accounting practice which is directly attributable to income tax legislation,
Magill, Taxable Income 1g (1936); Pearce, Income Tax Fundamentals iv (1937); Paton, op. cit.
supra note 6, at ui; Davies, The Changing Objectives of Accounting, 4 Accounting Rev. 94,
103-4 (1929); Husband, Accounting Postulates, 12 Accounting Rev. 386 (1937)-
9 "Accurate net income is the result of good guessing." Montgomery, Accounting and the
Concept of Income, in Magill, Lectures on Taxation 39, 42 (1932).
!O See Graham and Katz, Accounting in Law Practice 334-36 (2d ed. 1938).
11 "Some of these differences are due to special tax considerations and are necessary even if
in conflict with sound accounting usages. Others are designed to protect the government
against tricks of tax avoidance and hence appear to be justified." Gilman, Accounting Con-
cepts of Profit 17 (1939).
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But where accounting guides supply adequate safeguards it is difficult to
understand the need for rulings which, instead of accepting orthodox tech-
niques, compel the taxpayer to distort his annual income. This is par-
ticularly true with respect to the deduction of taxes from gross income,12
a deduction which, in many cases, is easily allocable to a specific period
of time.
I
The first federal income tax statute, the act of 1861, permitted the
deduction of taxes which were "assessed."' 3 This ambiguous allowance
caused no difficulty since the tax was not collected. However, a problem
of interpretation was presented by the acts of 1862 and 1864, which al-
lowed the deduction of "lawfully assessed" taxes by the person Who
"actually" paid "the same."' 4 Influenced by these two limitations,
the statute was apparently interpreted to permit only the allowance of
those taxes which were both assessed and paid within the year claimed. 5
Any hardships caused by this restriction were relieved in 1865 when the
statute was amended to permit the deduction of taxes "paid within the
year." 6 A tax which was assessed or which became due and payable in
one year and was not actually paid until a subsequent year could be de-
ducted only in the later year. 7 The cash disbursement basis for the deduc-
tion of taxes was also included in the act of I87O1 and the ineffectual act
of 1894."9
During the Civil War era the use of the cash basis for income tax pur-
poses may have been adequate for ordinary business. Small-scale produc-
tion and modest capital investments did not call for extensive accounting
records. But with the revolutionary growth of industry, commerce, and
finance which followed this era, legislation which borrowed the primitive
,2 Int. Rev. Code § 23 (c), 53 Stat. 12 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (c) (1940).
'3 "In estimating said income, all national, state, or local taxes assessed upon the property
from which the income is derived, shall be first deducted." 12 Stat. 309, at § 49 (1863).
14 "In estimating .... annual gain .... all .... taxes, lawfully assessed .... shall be
first deducted from the .... income of the person or persons who actually pay the same."
12 Stat. 473, at § 91 (1863); 13 Stat. 281, at § 117 (i866).
'5 See the tax return reprinted in Estee, Excise Tax Law 304 (x863), which reads, in part,
as follows: "4. Other national, state, and local taxes assessed and paid for the year 1862 and
not elsewhere included." In the act of 1864 the words "within the year" were added after
"lawfully assessed." 13 Stat. 281, at § 117 (i866).
A6 "All taxes paid within the year shall be deducted from the .... income of the person who
has actually paid the same." 13 Stat. 479 (x866).
17 See T. D., May i8, 1867, and T. D., January, 1868, in Digest of Internal Revenue
Decisions 1864-i898, at 128 (i9o6); 7 I.R.R. 6o in Bump, Internal Revenue Laws 292 (1870).
18 16 Stat 258, at § 9 (1871). '9 28 Stat. 553, at § 28, 556, at § 32 (1895).
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income concept of a simpler economy proved hopelessly inadequate even
in 1909. Although accountancy in the United States was still in its in-
fancy,2° the accrual method of computing annual profits had been adopted
to an extent which made it virtually impossible for many corporations to
comply with the Corporation Franchise Tax Act which required the use
of the cash basis.21 As a result, in order to administer the act effectively
it became necessary to permit many taxpayers to report on what was es-
sentially an accrual basis.- Yet in spite of the obvious disadvantages of
the prescribed method of reporting income found in the early legislation,
the first income tax statute under the Sixteenth Amendment, the act of
1913,23 also purported to require the taxpayer, corporate as well as in-
dividual, to use the cash basis.24 In conformity with this general plan
taxes were deductible only in the year actually paid.2s
Increasing pressure for statutory recognition of accounting principles
led Congress, in 1916, to give qualified approval to the use of the actual
method of reporting income. However, both the act of 1916 and the act
of I9M7 continued to employ the language of the earlier statutes when
providing for the allowance for taxes; deductible taxes were those "paid
within the year."' 6 Since many corporations prior to 1916 had deducted
taxes in the year paid even though their returns were primarily on an ac-
crual basis, it was argued in United States v. Anderson27 that the congres-
sional approval of the administrative practice did not require a change in
the method of deducting taxes-that a taxpayer on the accrual basis was
expressly authorized to take the deduction in the year paid instead of the
earlier year.8 In rejecting this contention the Supreme Court stressed
the importance of accurate income reporting. Pointing out that the at-
tempted departure from the accrual basis would clearly distort the tax-
20 In general see McLaren, The Influence of Federal Taxation upon Accountancy, 64 J. of
Accountancy 426 (i937); Paton, op. cit. supra note 6, at v.
21 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1927); cf. Reg. 3, Arts. 4, 5 and T.D.
1742, at ff 77, 14 Treasury Decisions, Internal Revenue 130 (1912).
22 See Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92, 97 (1930).
23,38 Stat. 166 (1915).
24Helvering v. Enright's Estate, 312 U.S. 6362 643 (I94I); Magill, Taxable Income xss
(1936); Gore, From Wickersham to Mellon, 42 J. of Accountancy 269 (1926).
's38 Stat. 167, at § II(B), 173, at § II(G)(b) (i915).
2639 Stat. 759, at § 5(a)(4th), 769, at § 12(a)(2d) (1917); 40 Stat. 33o, at § 12oI(I)(3d),
33s, at § 1207(I)(4th) (1919).
27 269 U.S. 422 (1926).
28 See Argument for Appellees, United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 427-31, 433
(J926).
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payer's gain for the year, it was declared that, while the deduction section
appeared to permit the subtraction of the tax in the year paid, this sec-
tion should be controlled by the general provisions relating to the method
of accounting used to compute taxable income. A taxpayer on the accrual
basis could deduct taxes only in the year in which they accrued.
The converse of the Anderson case was before the Supreme Court in
United States v. Mitchell. 9 The Revenue Act of 1918 had changed the
language relating to the deduction of taxes from taxes "paid" to taxes
"paid or accrued." 3° Consequently a taxpayer on the cash basis contended
that the statute permitted an election; that irrespective of the method of
accounting employed, taxes could be deducted either in the year paid or
in the year accrued. Again refusing to permit a deduction inconsistent
with the bookkeeping system of the taxpayer, the Court said: "It was not
the purpose of the Act to permit gross income actually received to be
diminished by taxes or other deductible items disbursed in a later year,
even if accrued in a taxable year. It is a reasonable construction of the
law that the same method be applied to both sides of the account."'"
Since all subsequent revenue acts have permitted the deduction of taxes
in the year "paid or accrued, '32 there has been little occasion to question
the rule established by the Anderson and Mitchell decisions. When a tax
accrues in one year and is paid in another the propriety of the deduction
in a specific period usually depends, of course, upon the method of ac-
counting employed by the taxpayer. With the exception of persons who
die during the tax year in question,'3 3 taxpayers on the cash basis must de-
duct taxes in the year paid34 while those on an accrual basis must take
29 271 U.S. 9 (1926).
3040 Stat. io67, at § 214(a)(3), 1077, at § 234(a)(3) (1919)o
31 United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1926).
3242 Stat. 239, at § 214(a)(3), 254, at § 234(a)(3) (1923); 43 Stat. 270, at § 214(a)(3),
284, at § 234(a)(3) (1925); 44 Stat. 26, at § 214(a)(3), 42, at § 234(a)(3) (1927); 45 Stat. 799,
at § 23(c) (1929); 47 Stat. I8o, at § 23(c) (1933); 48 Stat. 688, at § 23(c) (1934); 49 Stat.
1659, at § 23(c) (1936); 52 Stat. 460, at § 23(c) (1938); Int. Rev. Code § 23(c), 53 Stat. 12
(1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 23(C) (1940).
33 "In the case of the death of a taxpayer there shall be allowed as deductions and credits
for the taxable period in which falls the date of his death, amounts accrued up to the date of his
death ..... " Int. Rev. Code § 43, 53 Stat. 24 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 43 (ig4o), construed in
Roy J. O'Nell, 31 B.T.A. 727 (1934); cf. Milton D. Eisner, 9 B.T.A. 210 (1927). The accrual
in such cases was first required by the Revenue Act of 1934,48 Stat. 694, at § 43 (1934).
34 United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 (1926), explaining United States v. Woodward,
256 U.S. 632 (1921); Edward Hagelin, 37 B.T.A. 8 (1938); Arthur T. Galt, 31 B.T.A. 930
(1934); Benjamin I. Powell, 26 B.T.A. 509 (1932); Ida Wolf Schick, 22 B.T.A. 1o67 (193z);
First Nat'l Bank, 22 B.T.A. 1050 (1931); Corinth State Bank, 14 B.T.A. 1162 (1929); George
C. Beidleman, 7 B.T.A. 899 (1927); Henry Reubel, i B.T.A. 676 (1925); Sidney Weinberg,
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the deduction in the year accrued.35
II'
In determining the year in which a tax may be deducted it is necessary
to establish the system of accounting used by the taxpayer.36 Ordinarily
this problem causes little difficulty since the method employed may be
readily classified. However, the solution of the problem is not always ap-
parent. When there is a dispute it is clear that the Government will not
be bound by the declaration made by the taxpayer in his return.37 The
question will be answered through the ascertainment of the dominant plan
of the bookkeeping system rather than by the label applied to it by the
party in interest.48 An occasional departure will not change the general
classification which appears appropriate. $3 Thus minor deviations from
either basis will not affect the time for deducting taxes. 40 Somewhat great-
er uncertainty is caused by taxpayers engaged in and keeping separate
i B.T.A. 178 (1924); M. W. Alworth, 38 B.T.A. 656 (1938). For cases dealing with foreign
tax credit see William T. Rich, xi B.T.A. 1320 (1928); David A. Cunningham, 9 B.T.A. o5o
(1928); Albert D. Hewinson, i B.T.A. io8o (1925); Howard Earl Blood, x3 B.T.A. i49 (1928).
Beginning with the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 279, at § 22(c), 286, at § 238(c) (925), the
taxpayer on a cash basis could elect to take the credit in the year the foreign tax accrued. it.
Rev. Code § i 3i(d); 53 Stat. 57 (939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 13i(d) (194o); Russell-Miller Milling Co.,
27 B.T.A. 405 (932), aff'd 63 App. D.C. 74, 69 F. (2d) 393 (I934).
3s United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzabn,
282 U.S. 92 (193o); Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357 (I93O); Elmhirst v.
Duggan, I4 F. Supp. 782 (N.Y. 1936); Red Wing Potteries, Inc., 43 B.T.A. 841 (1941); Mar-
guerite Hyde Suffolk & Berks, 40 B.T.A. 1121 (I939); Hecla Mining Co., 35 B.T.A. 454 (N937);
American Cigar Co., 21 B.T.A. 464 (193o); Shurtleff Ice Cream Co., i B.T.A. ii68 (1925).
For cases dealing with foreign tax credits see Hygienic Products Co. v. Com'r, iii F. (2d) 330
(C.C.A. 6th 194o); Russell-Miller Milling Co. v. Helvering, 63 App. D.C. 74, 69 F. (2d) 393
(i934); Carter, Rice & Co., 28 B.T.A. 687 (1933), explaining Ruud Mfg. Co. v. Com'r, 45 F.
(2d) 63 (C.C.A. 3d 1930); Mead Cycle Co., io B.T.A. 887 (1928).
36 Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, 360 (1930).
37 Aluminum [Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92 (1930). The findings of the com-
missioner and the Board of Tax Appeals are said to be final. Hygienic Products Co. v.
Com'r, iii F. (2d) 330 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); see also Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States,
281 U.S. 357,360 (1930); United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 4n, 4.42 (1926); cf. United States
v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 12 (1926).
38 See Hygienic Products Co. v. Com'r, iii F. (2d) 330, 331 (C.C.A. 6th 194o).
39 "The return must be filed on the accrual basis .... where true income cannot be arrived
at on the basis of actual receipts and disbursements." Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn,
282 U.S. 92, 68 (r93o); see Clara A. McKee, ii B.T.A. 1381 (1928).
40 Cf. Comstock-Castle Stove Co., 4 B.T.A. 114 (1926).
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records for their unrelated business activities.4' Where some of the un-
related activities are recorded on the cash basis and others on the accrual
basis the taxpayer has been permitted to use both methods of accounting
as long as the method used for each business is consistently followed; in
conformity with the general rule, taxes are deductible in the year paid or
accrued depending upon the method of accounting used for the activity
giving rise to the imposition of the tax sought to be deducted.4
III
Where the taxpayer is on a cash basis, the problem of timing is compara-
tively simple. Since the actual payments may have no relation to the re-
ceipts of the taxpayer, there is little conscious effort to match income and
expense. Indeed, exactly the opposite is frequently the case; the payment
of deductible taxes may be anticipated or deferred solely for the purpose
of reducing the amount subject to the federal income tax in a given year.
The problem is largely one of determining what constitutes payment
within the meaning of the statute; neither the nature of the expenditure
nor the purpose for which it is made appears to affect its deductibility.
Generally speaking, payments may be in money, by check, or by the
performance of services. 43 Presumably the payment must be actually re-
ceived by the tax collector in the year the deduction is claimed; funds sent
through the mails in one period and not received until the next should be
allowed as a subtraction only in the latter period.44 Checks are ordinarily
deductible in the year delivered even though not collected until the follow-
ing year. 45 But post-dated checks are not treated as ordinary checks which
41 By way of illustration see Old Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 36 F.
Supp. 96I (Mich. 1939), aff'd per curiam ii7 F. (2d) 737 (C.C.A. 6th 194o).
4* In Cecil v. Com'r, ioo F. (2d) 896 (C.C.A. 4 th 1'939), the taxpayer's "Biltmore Es-
tate" business records were kept on an accrual basis while her more personal records were kept
on a cash basis. Consequently she was required to deduct property taxes on the estate in the
year of accrual rather than the year of payment. In Bennett Properties Co., 45 B.T.A. 112
(1941), the taxpayer, except for interest and taxes, used the cash method of accounting;
since the books were predominantly on a cash basis it was required to deduct taxes in the
year paid instead of the year accrued.
43 Where taxes are paid through services rendered, the taxpayer is not deprived of the
deduction, but the amount of it must also be treated as a part of the gross income. Watervliet
Paper Co., i6 B.T.A. 604 (1929).
44 Cf. Leach v. Com'r, 5o F. (2d) 371 (C.C.A. Ist 193z). The rule with respect to taxable
income, Avery v. Com'r, 292 U.S. 210 (x934), would seem applicable to this related situation.
45 Com'r v. Bradley, 56 F. (2d) 728 (C.C.A. 6th 1932), held that, where a check given in
payment of real estate taxes on the day before the taxpayer's death was not presented for
payment until after his death, the taxes could be deducted from the gross income of the de-
cedent. The delivery of the check constituted conditional payment; when actually paid the
condition subsequent was satisfied and the original payment became absolute.
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are honored in due course. 4 Similarly, a deposit of bonds to secure the
payment of a tax,47 money placed "irrevocably" in trust,4 8 or money
turned over to an agent of the taxpayer (even though the agent is also the
tax collector) 49 does not constitute payment which will enable a person on
the cash basis to deduct the tax in the year in which these transactions
take place. Even clearer is the instance where the taxpayer seeks to de-
duct the tax, not in the year paid, but in the later year in which he repays
a loan which had been obtained in order to pay the tax. 0 It should be
noted, however, that it may be possible to claim the deduction even
though payment is not actually made to the tax collector. Where there
has been a proper tender of the tax in one year and it is rejected, an accept-
ance in a later year may be deducted in the subsequent period; s' it is also
arguable that the tax, at the election of the payer, may be deducted in
the year in which tender was made and improperly refused s2
IV
In contrast with the great bulk of tax payments which offer little oc-
casion for dispute when the taxpayer is on a cash basis, a surprising num-
ber of problems have grown out of the provision relating to the deduction
of accrued taxes.s3 Since taxes represent an anomalous type of business
expense-a coercive exaction, frequently fluctuating widely in amount
and often having little relation to the direct benefits received-it is easy
to understand the lack of agreement as to the theoretical accounting basis
for their classification as a business expense. But regardless of whether it
is believed that taxes are not costs in the strict sense of the word and their
46 If a post-dated check is not payable until its date the instrument should be treated, for
tax purposes, as an ordinary promissory note, and, as in the case of such note, the transfer
would not constitute payment. Compare the rule in interest cases. Hart v. Com'r, 54 F. (2d)
848 (C.C.A. Ist 1932); S. E. Thomason, 33 B.T.A. 576 (1935).
47 Estate of Benjamin Piller, 29 B.T.A. 799 (1934).
48 Edward Hagelin, 37 B.T.A. 8 (1938); Arthur T. Gait, 31 B.T.A. 930 (i934).
49 Edward Hagelin, 37 B.T.A. 8 (1938).
so Ida Wolf Schick, 22 B.T.A. 1o67 (193); William D. Hutchins, i4 B.T.A. 421 (1928).
Similarly the person who makes the loan may not deduct the taxes paid by the borrower.
Busch v. Com'r, 5o F. (2d) 8oo (C.C.A. 5 th 1931).
51 Mary Stuart Honeyman, 24 B.T.A. 130 (193i); Robert B. Honeyman, Jr., 24 B.T.A. 126
(1931)-
s2 Some support for this view may be found in Leach v. Com'r, 5o F. (2d) 371, 373 (C.C.A.
Ist 1931). But see Robert B. Honeyman, Jr., 24 B.T.A. 126, 129 (1931).
s5 Unfortunate terminology may account for a part of the difficulty. In general see Magill,
op. cit. supra note 8, at 166; Parlin, Accruals to Date of Death for Income Tax Purposes, 87
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 295, 296 (1939); cf. Farrand and Farrand, Treatment of Accrued Items in the
Event of the Death of a Taxpayer, 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 431, 437-39 (i94o).
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treatment as siich is justified only on the ground of expediency54 or that
taxes, like other insurance costs, are paid to prevent the loss of property,,"
there is little dispute as to the elementary principles of bookkeeping in-
volved.
Where a business continues over a period of years and there is an at-
tempt to estimate the profits of one of the intermediate years, it is usually
necessary to make two kinds of adjustments. Liabilities may be incurred,
particularly those near the end of the accounting year, which have not
been recorded on the books of the business but which must be considered
when calculating the total expenses of the period; thus rent, wages, in-
terest, and similar expenses which are due and payable in a later period
must be "accrued" at the end of the year. Conversely, payments may
have been made and liabilities recorded which, while incurred during the
year, do not relate exclusively to current expense* but which must be de-
ferred to a later accounting period; a five-year insurance policy or a build-
ing having an estimated useful life of fifty years illustrates this type of
transaction; the expense represented by the extinguishment of the life of
the policy or the life of the building relates largely to future years, and it
is obviously erroneous to include the total amount in the expenses of the
year of purchase. Thus when estimating the annualsuccess of a business,
both accruals and deferments must be considereds6-and this is as true
of taxes as of other expenses.57 Tax liability may be incurred even though
the amount is not yet due and payable; such taxes must be accrued. Simi-
larly, taxes may be paid in advance for years other than those at hand; the
appropriate part of these taxes must be deferred. Unless both adjustments
are made, the steps preliminary to the accurate matching of income and
expense will be ignored.
It is reasonable to suppose that the provision relating to the deduction
of accrued taxes was included in the statute for the purpose of expressly
authorizing the taxpayer to make the deduction in a manner which would
permit the accurate reflection of current income. As has been seen, even
without congressional action and in the face of rather specific language
54 Paton, op. cit. supra note 6, at ioi-2.
5 Gilman, Accounting Concepts of Profit 314-I5 (i939); cf. Canning, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 37-38.
s
6 In general see Paton and Littleton, op. cit. supra note z, at 16 et seq.; Porter and Fiske,
Accounting 142, i4-46 (1935).
57 In addition to notes 5o and 5i supra, see Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 75, 82; Lawrence, Cost Accounting 182 (rev. ed. 1937); cf. Montgomery, Auditing
Theory and Practice 250-52, 298 (6th ed. i94o).
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this was the interpretation placed upon the Revenue Act of i916.58 In the
light of subsequent decisions and rulings it is unfortunate that the tax in
United States v. Anderson59 related exclusively to the accrual of taxes and
did not also involve the problem of deferment. In that case the federal
munitions tax,60 based on 1916 income, was not assessed or payable until
1917 and the taxpayer sought the deduction in the later year. The prob-
lem of deferred taxes was not involved and the Court naturally directed
its remarks toward the matter at hand. To meet the contention that a
tax could not accrue until it was assessed and became due the Court
pointed out that both the liability of the taxpayer and the amount of the
tax were sufficiently certain to warrant the deduction. "All events may
occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the
taxpayer to pay it. In this respect, for the purpose of accounting and of
ascertaining true income for a given accounting period, the munitions tax
here in question did not stand on any different footing than other accrued
expenses appearing on appellee's books."16, Inasmuch as the exaction re-
lated directly to the income subject to the federal income tax and was for
the same period, there was no occasion to discuss either the problem of ap-
portionment or the problem of attaching the tax to related income. The
munitions tax, being on income itself, represented the simplest imaginable
case of synchronization.6 2 Indeed, virtually the only method of treatment
which would fail to result in the matching of income and expense was at-
tempted by the taxpayer when an effort was made to treat the tax solely
as a liability; by limiting the question of accrual to the time the obligation
matured it was thus possible to argue that the tax did not "accrue" until
it became due and payable. However, the7Supreme Court was not misled.
by antiquated notions of balance sheet accounting;63 the income statement
was the important consideration. But in spite of the fact that accepted
accounting practice was clearly approved, the Treasury Department, the
Board of Tax Appeals, and many of the federal courts have stubbornly re-
sisted attempts to use orthodox techniques when allocating taxes to the
appropriate income years. Much of this resistance, however, may be at-
tributed to the unfortunate manner in which the tax allowance has been
treated in the various income tax acts.
s8 Pages 445-46 supra. S9 269 U.S. 422 (1926). 6o 39 Stat. 780 (i97).
61 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926).
62 See A.R.M. 26, 2 Cum. Bull. II5 (1920), where the Committee on Appeals and Review
had anticipated ihe decision reached by the Supreme Court. But see I.T. 3370, 1940-I Cum.
Bull. 32.
63 See Littleton, Accounting Evolution to igoo, at 356 (1933).
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V
As has been suggested elsewhere, 64 a tax should be treated as any other
payment or accrual. Those pertaining to the individual's personal ex-
penses should not be allowed as a deduction while those relating to, the
business affairs of the taxpayer should be governed by the accepted meth-
ods of accounting for similar expenditures. Since the deduction would or
would not be allowed depending upon whether it constituted a business
expense, the technical incidence of the exaction (which is now the decisive
question when dealing with non-business taxes) could be ignored. The
propriety of the deduction during the current year or its deferment to
some later period would then receive some consideration. However, this
has not been the method employed by Congress. Following the precedent
established in earlier income tax statutes Congress permitted the deduc-
tion of "all" taxes when it enacted the Corporate Excise Tax Act of
i9o9.6s In view of the crude income concept found in this legislation it
was not to be expected that the niceties of accounting would be observed
when providing for the deduction of taxes.66 The blanket allowance, how-
ever, disregarded a limitation customarily imposed upon even the crudest
type of cash accounting. When using the cash basis there are many dis-
bursements which are not deductible. Capital charges, such as buildings,
equipment, and other permanent investments, are not deductible in the
year of purchase. Yet in spite of this recognized qualification, taxes were
deductible even though they represented capital outlays.61 This basic
error was carried over to the later income tax legislation; not only the
taxpayers reporting on the cash basis but also the taxpayers reporting on
the accrual basis were permitted to deduct many taxes which represented
capital charges. Thus incorporation "fees" and other similar taxes 3 may
be deducted in the year the liability for them is incurred; even where
such treatment is appropriate there is no requirement that the amount of
64 See the writer's discussion in Deductions from Gross Income: Payments and Accruals
Deductible as "Taxes," 3 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. x (194i).
6
s 36 Stat. 113 (i91i). See pages 444-45 supra.
66 
"Net income shall be ascertained by deducting .... (fourth) all sums paid by it within
the year for taxes. " 36 Stat. 113 (1911).
67 Ibid.
68 Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., ii B.T.A. 1192 (1928); I. T. 2625, XI-i Cum. Bull.
25 (1932). If interpreted as afee instead of a tax the exaction is not deductible since it is a
capital expenditure. 3 Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §§ 23.28, 2s.o6
(1934). However, "fees" have been treated as taxes and the deduction allowed even though a
capital charge. Thus payments made to increase the authorized capital stock of a corporation
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the exaction be spread over the "life" of the tax.6 9 A tax need not be
deferred.7 °
This flagrant departure from customary accounting practice was the
natural result of including within the tax deduction provision both busi-
ness and non-business taxes. When the Supreme Court in United States v.
Woodward7' firmly established the principle that taxes may be deducted
irrespective of their relation to income72 it became necessary to determine
the year in which these unrelated taxes could be deducted by a taxpayer
on the accrual basis. Although such taxes were not business expenses,
they were very real liabilities. Accurate income reporting could not serve
as a guide, since a matching of expense and revenue was not involved. In-
stead it was necessary to accept the balance sheet concept of an accrual,
and taxes were considered in terms of liabilities rather than expenses.
The problem became one of discovering when the liability for the full
amount of the tax "accrued."
Since the Anderson case had rather effectively discouraged the use of
the day the tax became "due and payable" 73 as the event determining
may be deducted in full. Clark Thread Co., 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933); Michigan Central R. Co.,
28 B.T.A. 437 (1933); Borg & Beck Co., 24 B.T.A. 9o5 (i93i); Holeproof Hosiery Co., ii
B.T.A. 547 (1928); cf. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Burnet, 64 F. (2d) 957 (C.C.A. 3d
1933); Logan-Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B.T.A. 647 (1925); Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 3 B.T.A.
932 (1926); Summerill Tubing Co., 36 B.T.A. 347 (I937).
69 Stamp taxes on bonds issued by a corporation may be deducted in the year "paid or
accrued." United States Playing Card Co., 15 B.T.A. 975 (1929); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.,
30 B.T.A. 194 (1934); see Stires Corp., 28 B.T.A.i (1933); Commercial Investment Trust
Corp., 28 B.T.A. 143 (1933); cf. Paton, Accountants' Handbook 89o (2d ed. 1939); Hatfield,
Accounting 67 (1927).
70 Taxes on property during construction should be treated as a part of the cost of the prop-
erty. Paton and Littleton, op. cit. supra note i, at 89; Hatfield, Accounting 70 (x927). How-
ever, such taxes may also be deducted in the year "paid or accrued." See Harrisburg Hospital,
Inc., I B.T.A. 1014 (1929); Layman, Income Tax Deductions of Federal and Statq Social
Security Taxes, iS Tax Mag. 719, 761 (937).
71 256 U.S. 632 (1921). Although this case is no longer authority with respect to the time a
tax may be deducted, note 34 supra, and the specific tax in question has been subsequently dis-
allowed, op. cit. supra note 64, at 31, the principle that taxes may be deducted even though not
related to income does not appear to have been disturbed.
72 In computing taxable income the federal estate tax was held to be deductible from the in-
come of the decedent's estate.
73 A number of earlier cases had indicated that the tax "accrued" when it became "due and
payable," e.g., United States v. Woodward, 256 U.S. 632, 635 (1921); L. S. Ayers & Co., I
B.T.A. 1I35 (1925); Norwich & Worcester R. Co., 2 B.T.A. 215 (1925); Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 2 B.T.A. 892 (1925); Bartles-Scott Oil Co., 2 B.T.A. x6 (1925); Russell Milling Co., i
B.T.A. 194 (1924); Jamestown Worsted Mills, i B.T.A. 659 (1925); see May, Taxable Income
and Accounting Bases for Determining It, 40 J. of Accountancy 248, 264 (1925).
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when a tax "accrued," it became necessary to select some other stage in
the collection of revenue as the date which determined the deductibility
of the exaction. 74 Consequently the day of "assessment,"''T the date the
"liability" of the taxpayer was determined, 76 and the day the "lien" at-
tached to the property77 were frequently selected as the proper time to
accrue various taxes; the last mentioned date was easily the favorite when
property taxes were considered78 After selecting a date for the "accrual"
of a non-business tax it was, perhaps, too much to expect a busy adminis-
trative or judicial body to reexamine the question of accrual when con-
fronted with a business tax. In any event, considerations which led to the
selection of a specific day for the accrual of a personal tax were also ac-
cepted as determinative when considering the proper time for deducting
business taxes. And since a non-business tax could be deducted in a year
which bore no relation to the income-producing activities of the taxpayer
it automatically followed that business taxes could be deducted in a year
other than that in which the related income was earned. The problem
of matching could be ignored. If Congress saw no objection to the deduc-
tion of a personal tax which did not relate to income and thus permitted
74 The many steps in the collection of a general property tax make the choice a difficult one.
Seventeen are listed for Ohio. See Broh-Kahn, Accrual of General Property Tax in Ohio, 15
U. of Cin. L. Rev. 359, 368-69 (1941).
75 I. T. 3326, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 157. Frequently the "assessment" and some other event
will have occurred within the period in question and both will be emphasized. John H.
Hord, 33 B.T.A. 342 (1935), rev'd 95 F. (2d) 179 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); First Bond & Mortgage
Co., 27 B.T.A. 430 (1932); Leamington Hotel Co., 26 B.T.A. ioo4 (1932); cf. G.C.M. 22454,
1940-2 Cum. Bull. 21o; G.C.M. 22636, 1941-I Cum. Bull. 352, where the bureau has re-
luctantly modified its position, but only to the extent required by controlling decisions.
76 For references to the "liability of the taxpayer" as the time for accrual see Burchell v.
Helvering, 1I5 F. (2d) 681 (C.C.A. 2d I94O); Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 683
(C.C.A. 6th 1938); Union Bleachery v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 226 (C.C.A. 4th 1938); Ed. Schuster
& Co., Inc. v. Williams, 283 Fed. ii5 (C.C.A. 7 th 1922); S. E. & M. E. Bernheimer Co., 41
B.T.A. 249 (I94O), aff'd per curiam X21 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 2d 1941); Edward C. Kohlsaat,
40 B.T.A. 528 (:939); Gatens Investment Co., 36 B.T.A. 309 (i937); California Sanitary Co.,
Ltd., 32 B.T.A. 122 (i935); Great Northern R. Co., 30 B.T.A. 69x (i934); Arcade Dept. Store,
Inc., 18 B.T.A. 1172 (193o); Crown Willamette Paper Co., 14 B.T.A. 133 (1928); H. H. Brown
Co., 8 B.T.A. 112 (1927); Klauber Embroidery Works, ii B.T.A. 779 (1928). In American
Liberty Oil Co., 43 B.T.A. 76 (194o), Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 30 B.T.A. 738 (1934),
and Grand Hotel Co., 21 B.T.A. 89o (i93o), both the "personal liability" and the "lien"
events were stressed.
77 See Com'r v. Plestcheeff, ioo F. (2d) 62 (C.C.A. 9th 1938); Lifson v. Com'r, 98 F. (2d)
508 (C.C.A. 8th 1938), cert. den. 3o5 U.S. 662 (i939); T. H. Banfield, 42 B.T.A. 769 (194o);
Milton H. Friend, 40 B.T.A. 768 (x939); Estate of Charles Schimmel, 39 B.T.A. 989 (1939),
aff'd 114 F. (2d) 554 (C.C.A. 8th i94o); Cloquet Co-operative Society, 21 B.T.A. 744 (1930);
note 76 supra.
78 Pages 456 et seq. infra.
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an understatement of taxable income and a permanent loss of federal
revenue there was even less objection to the deduction in a single year of a
business tax which should be allocated over a number of years-the tem-
porary understatement of income would be (presumably) compensated by
an overstatement of income in subsequent years.Although the unnecessary generosity of Congress with respect to per-
sonal taxes discouraged administrative or judicial attempts to require the
matching of business taxes and taxable income, it was possible to limit
the scope of this broad deduction and somewhat limit the extent of the
distortion caused by it. In Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Allen 79 the deduction
by a corporation of a tax collected from it but laid upon its stockholders
was disallowed. Inasmuch as the corporation made no attempt to collect
the payment from its stockholders the amount in controversy was, in
effect, a dividend and properly eliminated as an expense; as was said by
the district court, if the result were otherwise the taxpayer would not
"correctly state its net income. ' 'So Unfortunately, however, later courts
apparently lost sight of this excellent reason for the earlier decision; it
was not repeated in similar cases. Without attempting to explain the ra-
tionale of their decisions the courts were content merely to state their
conclusions: the taxpayer could deduct only its "own" taxes!' Conse-
quently in many cases no effort was made to determine whether the dis-
allowance of "another's" tax did not also constitute the disallowance of
a proper business expense. Although the effect of these corporation-
stockholder tax cases was nullified when Congress later permitted the de-
duction,82 the general rule, strongly supported by the decisions involving
non-business taxes,8 3 continued to flourish. When one taxpayer paid the
personal taxes of another it was difficult to employ the reasoning of the
Nat'l Bank of Commerce decision, since it could hardly be argued that the
deduction of another's tax was to be denied because' the deduction dis-
torted the income of the person making the payment, an argument which
applied with equal force to the allowable deduction of one's "own" per-
79 2I1 Fed. 743 (D.C. Mo. 1914).
so Ibid., at 747; cf. Eliot Nat'l Bank v. Gill, 21o Fed. 933, 936 (D.C. Mass. 1913), aff'd 218
Fed. 6oo (C.C.A. 1st 1914).
81 Eliot Natl Bank v. Gill, 218 Fed. 6co (C.C.A. ist 1914); First Nat'l Bank v. McNeel,
238 Fed. 559 (C.C.A. 5th 1917); Porter v. United States, 27 F. (2d) 882 (C.C.A. 9th 1928),
cert. dismissed 279 U.S. 875 (r929); Northern Trust Co. v. McCoach, 215 Fed. 991 (D.C. Pa.
1914); cf. United States v. Central Nat'l Bank, 24 Fed. 577, 578 (D.C. N.Y. i885).
82 42 Stat. 239-40, 254-55 (1923); see'Int. Rev. Code §§ 23 (d), 203(a)(5), 53 Stat. 12, 72
(1939), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 2 3 (d), 203(a)(5) (1940).
8' See op. cit. supra note 64, at 6 et seq. (1941).
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sonal taxes.8 4 Consequently it soon became established that a tax paid
for another could not be deducted as a tax 8s even though the payment rep-
resented a business expense. Furthermore, the allowance for taxes, as has
been seen, 86 was also restricted by the requirement that the exaction could
be deducted as a tax only in the year in which the tax was "paid or
accrued."' 7 With the development of these two limitations the foundation
was laid for the many cases involving the deduction of taxes upon property
which was transferred during a given year.
In breaking away from the income concept when dealing with taxes it
became easy to ignore the usual accounting conventions pertaining to it.
Where the taxpayer purchases property burdened with unpaid taxes it is
obvious that the taxes for past years do not represent current expenses;
they should be capitalized.8" The cases so holding8 9 reach a correct result,
but this reason for the decision is not always given.90 Too frequently the
84 Some of the difficulties occasioned by this "rule" are found in Borland v. Com'r, z23 F.
(2d) 358 (C.C.A. 7th 1941).
"5 Although not deductible as a tax, such payments frequently were deductible as a business
expense. Thus lessees who agreed to pay taxes on property leased could deduct the tax as
rent if the property was used in the taxpayer's trade or business. John D. Fackler, 39 B.T.A.
395 (1939); Denholm & McKay Co., 39 B.T.A. 767 (I939). But where the business "volun-
tarily" pays the tax it is not deductible even as a business expense. Robinson v. Com'r, 53
F. (2d) 8ro (C.C.A. 8th ig3i); Nat'l Piano Mfg. Co. v. Burnet, 6o App. D.C. i6o, 5o F. (2d)
310 (1931); 1. T. 3382, X940-1 Cum. Bull. 12.
16 Pages 446-47 supra.
87 For an unnecessarily harsh application of the annual accrual requirement see Swain &
Myers, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 360 (i94o), where the taxpayer was required to include the amount of
the local sales tax in its gross income but was not permitted to deduct the tax on those credit
sales which had not yet been collected.
88 See Joell Co., 41 B.T.A. 825, 827 (i94o); California Sanitary Co., Ltd., 32 B.T.A. 122,
125 (i935).
89 Falk Corp. v. Com'r, 6o F. (2d) 204 (C.C.A. 7th 1932); Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v.
Helvering, 84 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th 1936); Joell Co., 41 B.T.A. 825 (194o); Midtown Tower,
Inc., 4o B.T.A. xx6 (1939); Luke W. McCrory, 25 B.T.A. 994 (1932); Grand Hotel Co., 21
B.T.A. 89o (193o). In such cases i) the vendor on an accrual basis would deduct the tax
each year as it accrued, T. H. Symington & Son, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 711 (I937); see First Bond &
Mortgage Co., 27 B.T.A. 430, 432 (1932); 2) the vendor on a cash basis would deduct the
tax in the year paid by the vendee and treat the payment as an addition to the amount received
from the sale for the purpose of determining gain or loss, Norman Cooledge, 40 B.T.A. 1325
(1939), vacating 40 B.T.A. 1io (i939); see Mim. 5200, 1941-3 C.C.H. Fed. Tax Serv. 6424.
But see Nunnally Investment Co. .United States, 36 F. Supp. 332 (Ct. Cl. 194X). In addition,
if a wasting asset is concerned, the vendee is permitted to amortize the cost over the life of
the asset when it is used for business purposes. Midtown Tower, Inc., 40 B.T.A. xi6 (1939).
9 See Shearer v. Com'r, 48 F. (2d) 552, 555 (C.C.A. 2d 1931) ("the form of the statute
must control"); Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C.C.A. 8th 1934)
(no discussion); Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 84 F. (2d) 478, 481 (C.C.A. 8th 1936)
("a deduction may only be taken by that taxpayer whose property gives rise to the deduc-
tion").
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opinion contains merely the statement that one taxpayer may not deduct
another's tax. 9' It is this unnecessarily broad generalization which causes
so much difficulty when dealing with current taxes. The early cases con-
sidering the deductibility of taxes assessed on property transferred during
the year did not depart from orthodox practice even though they were
later cited as a justification for the distortion of the taxpayer's annual
income. In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. 2 property was purchased
in September, the taxes for the year having "accrued" on April i, and the
commissioner permitted the deduction of that part of the tax allocable to
the time the property was held by the purchaser but not that part allo-
cable to the period prior to purchase; in sustaining the action of the
commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals followed recognized accounting
procedure. In Shearer v. Com'r 93 the federal motor tax imposed upon
dealers was "passed on" to the purchaser who sought to deduct it from
his gross income; in disallowing the deduction the decision appears satis-
factory, from an accounting point of view, since the tax should be treated
as a part of the cost of the automobile and, if deducted at all, it should be
recovered as depreciation over the life of the asset. Again, in Falk Corp. V.
CoM'r,9  where one corporation acquired the assets of another and agreed,
as a part of the purchase price, to pay the state income tax of the latter,
the requirement that the tax be capitalized, rather than deducted either
in the year paid or in the year contractual liability for it was incurred,
dearly conformed to customary usage; the payment was a part of the cost
of the asset and it should not be deducted in its entirety in a single year.
However, the increasing emphasis upon the question of the technical
imposition of the tax rather than the accounting character of the exaction
ultimately led to decisions which disregarded the latter and more relevant
problem. In Arcade Dept. Store, Inc.,95 a corporation was permitted to
deduct the full amount of an annual tax on assets owned by its predecessor
partnership, when the corporation had acquired the property before the
day the taxes were said to have "accrued." Since the corporation paid
its "own" tax the Board of Tax Appeals saw no objection to the deduction.
Other board decisions during this period reflected this same approach;
persons acquiring property before the day of "accrual" were entitled to
the full amount of the year's tax96 but a purchaser after this day was
9' See Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering, 84 F. (2d) 478, 481 (C.C.A. 8th 1936);
Luke W. McCrory, 25 B.T.A. 994, iou (1932); First Bond & Mortgage Co., 27 B.T.A. 430,
432 (1932).
92io B.T.A. 736 (1928). 94 6o F. (2d) 204 (C.C.A. 7th 1932).
9' 48 F. (2d) 552 (C.C.A. 2d 1931). 9s iS B.T.A. 1172 (1930).
9'Theodore Plestcheef, 35 B.T.A. 5o8 (1937).
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denied any deduction for the year.9 7 Where a business organization ac-
quired, for example, an apartment building subject to an annual tax of
$5o,000 there would be no deduction for the year of acquisition if the tax
"accrued" January i even though the property was purchased the follow-
ing day,"5 while a taxpayer in another jurisdiction could take the full de-
duction if the tax "accrued" December 31 even though the property was
acquired the preceding day.99
Because of the evident distortion of the tax base resulting from this
arbitrary treatment of an expense it is unfortunate that the federal courts
were not more critical when confronted with the problem.,00 The view of
the Board of Tax Appeals was, ostensibly at least, accepted in Helvering v.
Missouri State Life Ins. Co.'0 ' when a purchaser was again denied the de-
duction of current taxes which had become a lien upon the property prior
to acquisition. Although this case purported to accept the board rule, it
may be explaiied on the ground that the taxpayer was an insurance com-
pany subject to special income tax provisions enacted because of the tre-
mendous difficulties encountered when attempting to estimate the annual
income of such organizations;'2 since these provisions departed in many
respects from orthodox income concepts 03 it is arguable that life insurance
company cases should not be considered persuasive when considering the
problem of the ordinary taxpayer. Yet in spite of the anomalous character
97 Leamington Hotel Co., 26 B.T.A. 1004 (1932); First Bond & Mortgage Co., 27 B.T.A.
430 (1932); Alden Anderson, 27 B.T.A. 98o (I933); Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 o B.T.A.
736 (1934); California Sanitary Co., Ltd., 32 B.T.A. 122 (1935).
98 Consider, for example, the taxes in American Liberty Oil Co., 43 B.T.A. 76, 8i (194o), and
Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 3 o B.T.A. 736 (1934); I. T. 3388, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 66; I. T.
3414, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 7o; I. T. 3435, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 73; I. T. 35o6, 1941-3 C.C.H. Fed.
Tax Serv. 65i9.
99 Johnson County Realty Co., 44 B.T.A. 121 (1941).
loo From both a practical and a theoretical point of view the result seems unsatisfactory.
Aside from the question of accurate net income, the emphasis upon the technical imposition of
the tax ignores not only customary practice but also economic principles. Many taxes on prop-
erty are "capitalized" and the original owner at the time the tax was imposed bears the full
burden even though the purchaser pays taxes subsequent to acquisition. In a very real sense,
unless the rates are increased the purchaser never pays his "own" tax. See Twentieth Century
Fund, Facing the Tax Problem 238 et seq. (1937); Kendrick, Incidence and Effects of Taxa-
tion, 27 Am. Econ. Rev. 725, 730 (1937); Einaudi, Capitalization and Amortization of Taxes,
3 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 211 (x935); Seligman, Shifting and Incidence of Taxation 174 et seq., 221
et seq. (5th ed. 1927).
78 F. (2d) 778 (C.C.A. 8th 1934).
002 In general, see 4 Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 36.oI (1934).
i03 By way of illustration see Com'r v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 67 F. (2d) 209 (C.C.A. 7 th
1933) (taxes on life insurance building not deductible since taxpayer failed to include rental
value in gross income).
DEDUCTIBLE TAXES AND TAXABLE INCOME
of life insurance taxation the Missouri State Life Ins. Co. decision was
cited, in Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering,0 4 as authority for the
proposition that grantees could not deduct as an expense taxes which had.
become a lien before transfer. Since the tax in the latter case was for the
year prior to purchase the deduction was properly denied and the Falk
Corp. decision, quoted in the opinion, was ample authority for the point
actually decided: back taxes should be capitalized.
In Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Comrnro s the doctrine of the Board of Tax Ap-
peals was accepted by a court which, three months earlier, had permitted
the beneficiary of a trust to deduct current property taxes assessed against
the trustees but paid by the beneficiary after the termination of the
trust. °6 Limiting the earlier case to its facts, the court held that a corpora-
tion which was organized on April 16 and which immediately afterward
acquired certain real estate could not deduct any part of the current taxes
assessed on it because the tax "accrued" on April 12. In spite of the fact
that the annual charge was clearly allocable, in part, to the time the tax-
payer owned the property, Judge Florence Allen said that "since none of
the payment was made in liquidation of petitioner's liability, a propor-
tionate deduction of that part of the tax allocable to the period .... in-
stead of fairly reflecting petitioner's income, would have resulted in a dis-
tortion thereof.""'' 7
Other federal courts also followed the rule laid down by the Board of
Tax Appeals. The taxpayer in Lifson v. Com'rx°5 was denied the deduction
of a current tax when property was purchased after the tax had become a
lien on the real estate and was allowed the full deduction in Com'r v.
Plestchee.P° 9 when the property was purchased before the current tax be-
came a lien on the property. The taxpayers in the last two cases were on
a cash basis and the great inaccuracies of this method of accounting may
serve to mitigate the criticism of the result. But in Walsh-McGuire Co. v.
Com'r1° the taxpayer was on an accrual basis and the result would clearly
seem to violate the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in United
104 84 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 8th 1936).
'05 97 F. (2d) 983 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); cf. Broh-Kahn, op. cit. supra note 74, at 385-88, 395-
96.
*06Hord v. Com'r, 95 F. (2d) 179 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); John Edgerly Morrell, 43 B.T.A.
651 (194).
07 Walsh-McGuire Co. v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 983, 985 (C.C.A. 6th 1938). The Hord case
was distinguished on the ground that the taxpayer was the beneficial owner of the property
"at the time of the incidence of the tax."
108 98 F. (2d) 508 (C.C.A. 8th 1938), cert. den. 305 U.S. 662 (1939).'
o9 oo F. (2d) 62 (C.C.A. 9th 1938). "O 97 F. (gd) 983 (C.C.A. 6th 1938).
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States v. Anderson' when it declared that the deduction of a tax did not
depend upon its accrual in a "technical legal sense" but in an "economic
and bookkeeping sense." Technically the tax had accrued before the pur-
chase of the property, but in an accounting sense the tax should have been
spread over the entire tax year; otherwise the revenues received from. the
use of the property by the taxpayer for the remainder of the year would
not bear the burden of the tax properly allocable to this activity.
However, in spite of numerous analogies" 2 leading to the conclusion
that annual taxes should be treated, for income tax purposes, as relating
to a single day, there is a definite trend away from this view and toward
that indicated by the Anderson decision. In Com'r v. Coward"13 the tax-
payer who purchased real estate on January 8 was permitted to deduct all
but 8/365 of the tax assessed for the year of purchase. Rejecting the rule
of thumb provided by the "tax day" concept, the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit observed that the taxpayer's income was largely
derived from real estate and with the exception of 8/365 of the tax "one
cannot imagine a clearer case for the deduction."' X" 4 Thus the requirement
of accurate reflection of annual income, previously rejected, s5 was again
recognized. In Carondelet Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Fonteno" 6 the taxpayer pur-
chased property on May io, capitalized that part of the year's tax allo-
cable to the time prior to purchase, deducted that part allocable to the
period May io to September 30, the end of the taxpayer's fiscal year, and
deferred to the following fiscal year the balance. In approving this prac-
tice it was said that the corporation "knew the rents which were accruing
each month could not be treated as net, but ought to bear the monthly
"' 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926). See Ellis, Deductions for Accrued Taxes, 14 Tax Mag. 197
(1936).
112 Supposed administrative convenience has led to the use of a day certain for the purpose
of determining the taxability of persons or property. Thus the existence of property, its situs,
or its ownership on a specific day will frequently determine the person subject to the tax and
whether or not given property will be taxed during the year. The tax day is also important
when considering the question of exemptions. See 2 Cooley, Taxation §§ 546, 712 (4th ed.
1924). In the administration of trusts the problem of allocating tax expenditures to principal
and income has been solved by reference to the time the tax attached. The same has been true
with respect to the problem of apportioning tax expenses between the life tenant and remain-
derman or reversioner. However, in both types of situations the rule of apportionment usually
prevails. 3 Simes, Future Interests 28-29 (i936); 2 Scott, Trusts 1326-27 (1939); see i Rest.,
Property §129(g) (1936); Rest., Trusts § 237(a) (i935).
"13 11o F. (2d) 725 (C.C.A. 3d i94o). "4 Ibid., at 728-29.
"xsHelvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778 (C.C.A. 8th i934); Walsh-
McGuire Co. v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 983 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); First Bond &Mortgage Co., 27 B.T.A.
430 (1932).
216 1i F. (2d) 267 (C.C.A. 5 th x94o).
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pro rata of the annual taxes to fairly reflect net income." The commis-
sioner "did not disapprove of the taxpayer's method of accounting because
not fairly reflecting income for the period, but solely because he concluded
that as a matter of law 'real and personal property taxes in Louisiana
accrue for federal income tax purposes on Jan. i each year.' We think
there is no such rule of law ..... Looking rather to a just accounting that
will truly reflect net income,, we think that the prorated deduction as
claimed ought to have been maintained. ' '"17 In Com'r v. Rust's Estate, 8
the purchaser of property was again permitted to deduct that part of the
annual real estate tax allocable to the time the property was held by the
purchaser. "Taxes upon real estate constitute an ever recurring burden;
and when, as in this case, the property is held as an investment, they are
perforce treated as a current expense to be offset against current income.
. The apportionment of the tax was clearly correct ..... The oppos-
ing theory advanced by the Commissioner .... does violence to the pur-
pose of the income tax statutes that items of income shall be accounted
for in annual periods. Clearly this purpose will not be served if the con-
stantly recurring burden of the tax is refused recognition as an item of
current expense and is placed in the category of a capital expense to be
reckoned with under the income tax statutes only in the event of sale at
some future date."" 9
In the Coward decision emphasis was laid on the fact that the tax in
question had not become a lien upon the property at the time of transfer,
that the local statute did not impose a personal liability upon the owner,
and that the purchaser had not contracted to pay the tax in question."
Consequently it was possible to distinguish the federal cases which had
accepted the "tax day" idea."' In the Carondelet Bldg. Co. and the Rust's
Estate opinions the absence of personal liability for taxes and the fact that
a lien had not attached at the time of the purchase were also empha-
sized.' However, in the latter decision the parties had agreed to appor-
tion the tax"23 and the court also questioned, but refused to decide,
whether the personal liability of the vendor or a lien upon the property
17 Ibid., at 269.
-8 116 F. (2d) 636 (C.C.A. 4th 194o). Parker, J., dissented.
li9 Ibid., at 638-39.
120 Com'r v. Coward, zio F. (2d) 725, 727 (C.C.A. 3d 194o).
121 Ibid., at 727 n. o.
122 Carondelet Bldg. Co. v. Fontenot, iii F. (2d) 267, 268 (C.C.A. 5th 194o); Com'r v.
Rust's Estate, ii6 F. (2d) 636, 637-38 (C.C.A. 4th 194o).
23 Com'r. v. Rust's Estate, 1i6 F. (2d) 636, 638 (C.C.A. 4th 194o).
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at the time of sale should affect its decision.- 4 It was not until Supplee v.
Magruder 5 that a federal court permitted the purchaser to deduct his
share of a local tax on property purchased during the year even though
the purchaser was under a contractual obligation to pay the tax, the tax
had become a lien upon the property before purchase, and, apparently,
the tax was a personal liability of the vendor. Pointing out that there
would have been no question as to the propriety of the deduction if the
statute had not specifically provided for the deduction of taxes since the
tax in question was necessary to the taxpayer's real estate business and
thus was a business expense,"16 the "tax day" treatment was rejected and
the local custom127 of apportioning taxes accepted as controlling. The
problem of taxes in arrears was distinguished" 8 and that of current
expenses emphasized. "The general purpose of the income tax is to
find and tax the true net income as defined in the statute. This is ac-
complished only when current taxes and similar items are deducted from
the current income. When an income taxpayer purchases investment
property he is chargeable only with the income subsequently accruing from
the property, and current charges against it are properly deductible to
ascertain net income. If the current income is adjusted to the date of
transfer, similarly the current charges against the income should be like-
wise adjusted."'19 On appeal the lower court was affirmed in a per curiam
opinion on the basis of the Rust's Estate decision.130
In spite of these recent cases, however, the decisions with respect to
'transfers and related problems are by no means unanimous. In Burchelt v.
Helvering'3x the attention of the court was focused exclusively upon the
problem of ascertaining, under local law, the exact day upon which a tax
"accrued." The Board of Tax Appeals has also taken varying positions.
In T. H. Banfield&32 the taxpayer who purchased property on March 4 was
"4 Ibid., at 640.
12536 F. Supp. 722 (Md. 1941), aff'd per curiam 123 F. (2d) 399 (C.C.A. 4th 1941), cert.
granted io U.S.L. Week 3283 (1942).
126 Ibid., at 725. X7 Ibid., at 726. 12s Ibid., at 727. 19Ibid., at 728.
X30 Magruder v. Supplee, 123 F. (2d) 399 (C.C.A. 4th 1941). "Judge Parker dissents on the
ground that the taxes paid, being a lien on the land and a personal liability of the vendor at the
time of the conveyance to the taxpayer, were not deductible by the latter from income, for the
reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion in the Rust case." Ibid., at 400.
x3 it5 F. (2d) 681 (C.C.A. 2d 194o). The testator died November 12, 1934, and his execu-
tor, pursuant to § 43 of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 694 (r934), attempted to de-
duct the current annual property tax from the testator's income. The deduction was denied be-
cause the court, while confessing to "considerable uncertainty," was of the opinion that the
tax "accrued" in December.
132 42 B.T.A. 769 (194o); see M. P. Klyce, 41 B.T.A. 194 (1940).
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not permitted a tax deduction for that year since the lien attached on
March i. Yet in New Orleans.Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., Ltd.' S' the
taxpayer changing its accounting year was permitted to defer Io/I2 of an
annual tax which had "accrued" in the preceding fiscal year. And in God-
frey L. Cabot, lnc.134 the taxpayer was permitted to prorate the annual tax
on a monthly basis and thus spread the tax over the appropriate part of
successive fiscal years. Again in S. E. &' M. E. Bernheimer Co."35 a prora-
tion was allowed; the taxpayer changed its accounting year from a calen-
dar year to a fiscal year ending September 3o and was permitted to deduct
9/12 of the annual tax in that year. 36 This case was affirmed in a memo-
randum opinion"37 citing United States v. Anderson"31 and Carondelet Bldg.
Co., Inc. v. Fontenot,"39 by the same court which decided the Burchell case.
However, in Crown Zellerbach Corp.140 the board reverted again to the
"tax day" technique when it denied the taxpayers the right to prorate an-
nual taxes to the proper fiscal years in conformity with their usual ac-
counting practice. While the New Orleans, Cabot, and Bernheimer cases
involved the accounting methods of the same taxpayer and did not present
the supposed difficulty found in those situations where one person paid
another's tax, subsequent decisions make it clear that the board has not
rejected the "tax day" concept of a tax accrual.' 4' In Citizens Hotel Co.1 42
the taxpayer was denied the right to allocate on a monthly basis the tax
for the year; although it had merely changed its accounting year, the tax
for those months which fell in the new fiscal period was not deductible
133 40 B.T.A. 121 (1939). The taxpayer changed its method of reporting from a fiscal year
ending February 28-29 to a calendar year. Thus the period in question was March x to De-
cember 31. Although the tax became a "liability" on January i, the board recognized that
"the pertinent question here is whether the method of bookkeeping employed by the peti-
tioner correctly reflected the income of the petitioner ..... We think it did." Ibid., at 123,
126.
'34 40 B.T.A. 366'(1939). The taxpayer's books were based on a fiscal year ending Sep-
tember 30, and state taxes assessed each calendar year were allocated on a monthly basis.
13 41 B.T.A. 249 (1940).
X36 "This action we believe to have been proper and to have been in accord with the prin-
ciples of accrual accountancy." Ibid., at 254.
37 Helvering v. Bernheimer Co., 121 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 2d 1941).
138 269 U.S. 422 (1926). l9 i F. (2d) 267 (C.C.A. 5th i94o).
14043 B.T.A. 541 (r94I).
14' Note the attitude reflected in G.CM. 22113, 1940-1 CuM. Bull. 123. With reference
to the Coward case it was said: "the application of that decision will be confined to cases deal-
ing with New Jersey real property taxes." Compare the statement in G.C.M. 22613, 1941-I
Cum. Bull. 301: "the decision in the Rust case will not be given general application but will
be applied only in cases involving District of Columbia real property taxes."
142 44 B.T.A. 56o (1941).
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because it was a "personal" liability which had become a "lien" on the
property during the first of the accounting years in question. Thus the
judicial limitation upon the deduction of taxes which had been invoked to
prevent the further distortion of income where one taxpayer attempted to
deduct the tax paid for another 43 was applied in a manner which de-
feated, in part, its original purpose.
The present attitude of the Board of Tax Appeals was stated in Pyramid
Metals Co.144 The taxpayer purchasing property on August i was not per-
mitted to deduct an aliquot part of the year's tax because it was said that
the tax "accrued" on April i. Commenting upon the contrary doctrine
represented by the Supplee decision, the board said: "The long estab-
lished rule based on sound reason should not be plowed under at this late
date." Whatever may have been the "sound reason" for its holding, it
admittedly was not sound accounting practice. Section 43 of the Internal
Revenue Code, requiring the accurate reporting of income, was said to be
inapplicable to "minor items" like those before the board for decision.
VI
When reporting on an accrual basis the taxpayer may invoke the anti-
quated balance sheet concept of accounting and deduct taxes in the year
in which the liability was incurred instead of using the more accurate in-
come statement concept and deduct the tax in the year in which the re-
lated income was earned. However, the taxpayer is permitted, in many
cases, to employ the latter concept if he so elects.
Where a tax is imposed as the result of an act over which the taxpayer
has some control, it is apparent that the tax should be considered a part
of the cost of the transaction. A duty on imports or an excise tax on the
manufacture of some product may properly be considered a part of the
cost of the article imported or manufactured. 4s A matching of revenue
and expense would require the deduction of the tax as a part of the cost
of goods at the time they are sold; where commodities are imported or
X43 See page 455 supra.
'44 44 B.T.A. io87 (1941). In American Liberty Oil Co., 43 B.T.A. 76 (194o), the Caronde-
let case was distinguished; there being, under the local law, both a personal liability and a
lien before the transfer, the deduction for current taxes was denied. In Johnson County
Realty Co., 44 B.T.A. 121 (1941), and Lowell H. Chamberlain, 4 3 B.T.A. 259 (1941), property
was-acquired after "the" day and the full deduction was allowed. As a result of conflicting
decisions it has recently been observed that when property is sold between tax dates "it's
anybody's guess now whether the taxes are deductible by the seller, the buyer, both, or neither,
in whole or in part." Seidman, Salient Features of Federal Income Taxes-i94i Style, 73
J. of Accountancy 37, 40 (1942).
x"5 Porter and Fiske, Accounting 380 (1935).
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manufactured in one year and sold in another the tax on them is a signifi-
cant item of expense in the later year only. Although it is said that "the
question is not free from doubt," the taxpayer may take the tax deduction
as a part of the cost-of goods sold in the year of sale rather than in the year
the legal obligation to the taxing authority arose.X46 As long as there is no
duplication of the deduction this treatment is sound.' 47 It should be noted,
however, that the taxpayer is not required to take the deduction in the
later year; the deduction may be taken in the year in which the liability
arose--and this even though the preferable method was followed when
keeping books for ordinary accounting purposes. 45 it is evident that when
dealing with taxes of this character the latter treatment may be only
slightly less inaccurate than the cash disbursements method of reporting
taxable income.
Where the tax is a recurrent charge it becomes necessary to relate this
expense to specific activity. The levy, assessment, and collection of the
tax may extend over a period longer than a year.149 These recurrent im-
positions take place every twelve months, but the amount of the tax may
4 6 LeBolt & Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 422, 428 (1929); cf. Elmira Arms Co., 7 B.T.A.
703 (1927); 0. D. i37, i Cum. Bull. 112 (99); Mim. 5200, 1941-3 C.C.H. Fed. Tax Serv.
6424.
'47 An analogous problem is presented when property is held for future sale. The capi-
talization of current taxes in such cases is generally approved by accountants. See Paton,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 257; Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice 616 (4 th ed. 1927);
cf. Westerfield v. Rafferty, 4 F. (2d) 590 (D.C. N.Y. 1925). However, in spite of § 202(b) of
the Revenue Acts of 1924, 43 Stat. 255 (1925), and of 1926, 44 Stat. il (1927), and § 111(a)
of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 815 (1929), which provided for expenditures "properly
chargeable to capital account," according to statements found in the Report of the Com-
mittee on Ways and Means, H.R. Rep. 179, 68th Cong. ist Sess., at 12 (1924), and Reg. 69,
Art. i561 (1926), the capitalization of such taxes was disallowed in Central Real Estate Co. v.
Com'r, 47 F. (2d) io36 (C.C.A. 5th 1931). Section 113(b)(I) of the Revenue Act of 1932,
47 Stat. 201 (2933), expressly corrected this error. Int. Rev. Code § 1i 3 (b)(i)(A), 53 Stat.
201 (r939), 26 U.S.C.A. § Ii 3 (b)(i)(A) (i94o); Patrick McGovern, Inc., 4o B.T.A. 7o6
(1939); I. T. 3434, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. go; Reg. io3, at § 19.42-4 (i 94o), for the treatment of
taxes in long term contract situations.
148 Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Com'r, 77 F. (2d) 3o6 (C.C.A. 2d 1935), explaining LeBolt v.
United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 422 (1929); Reg. io3, at § 19.23 (c)-2; Layman, op. cit. supra note 70,
at 761; I. T. 3389, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 67. If the taxpayer may repudiate his own method of ac-
counting it is to be expected that the Government in other types of cases will exercise the same
privilege. Compare Atlantic Coast Line Co., 2 B.T.A. 892 (1925), and First Nat'l Bank, 22
B.T.A. o5o (i93i), with Armstrong Cork Co., 24 B.T.A. 1 (193i), New Orleans Cold Storage
& Warehouse Co., Ltd., 4o B.T.A. 121 (ig39), and Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc., 4o B.T.A. 366
(1939).
X49 See the taxes considered in Helvering v. Schimmel, 114 F. (2d) 554 (C.C.A. 8th 194o);
Cecil v. Com'r, 1oo F. (2d) 896 (C.C.A. 4 th 1939); Cloquet Co-operative Society, 22 B.T.A.
744 (Ng3o); Universal Winding Co., 39 B.T.A. 962 (x939); Columbian Carbon Co., 25 B.T.A.
456 (1932).
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be determined by events occurring over several years. 50 For example, a
corporate privilege tax may be measured by the income of the preceding
year or by the average income of a number of years and it may not be
payable until a subsequent year. Where there is no liability for the tax
unless the corporation is doing business during a part of a given year this
condition would ordinarily indicate the specific twelve months for which
the tax was laid.'5' All of the income-producing activity of the taxpayer
during this period should bear its proper part of the burden. Similarly
the general property tax of a manufacturing concern is often distributed
with the other overhead of the business and becomes a part of the cost of
goods manufactured'5 ' and, as in the case of taxes more directly related to
specific activity, is not actually deducted from gross income until these
goods are sold. Thus 1941 taxes, although apparently deducted in full in
that year, would actually be reduced by the amount that such taxes were
included in ending inventories and this amount so absorbed would be de-
ducted in some later year; in effect, a part of the tax deduction is deferred,
a deferment in accord with good accounting practice and permitted under
the present legislation. Presumably, however, the taxpayer may elect to
deduct the tax in full in the-year liability for it was incurred instead of
deferring the part allocable to the business of later years. 5 3 In view of the
difficulties involved in distributing general taxes where the business is en-
gaged in a variety of activities this non-deferment is less objectionable
than the same treatment of taxes which represent capital expenditures or
those which clearly relate to a specific product. But even here, when the
taxpayer has followed the more acceptable practice for usual accounting
purposes, it is questionable policy to permit a different treatment for the
purpose of computing taxable net income.
Greater difficulties are encountered when the taxpayer and the taxing
authorities are on different accounting years.5 4 When, for example, the
local government lays a tax on a calendar year basis and the taxpayer re-
X°S E.g., Art Metal Construction Co. v. United States, x7 F. Supp. 854 (Ct. Cl. 1937); Ameri-
can Laundry Mchinery Co., 32 B.T.A. 793 (1935); Stuart W. Webb, 5 B.T.A. 366 (1926). Note
149 supra.
I S1Kossar & Co., 16 B.T.A. 952 (1929); Petaluma & Santa Rosa R. Co., ii B.T.A. 541
(1928); cf. Stuart W. Webb, 5 B.T.A. 366 (1926).
'52 Paton, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1o2; Van Sickel, Cost Accounting 259, 261 (1938);
Sanders, Cost Accounting for Control i65 (1934).
ZS3 Compare the similar treatment of import duties, note 148 supra.
154 See S. E. & M. E. Bernheimer Co., 41 B.T.A. 249 (1940), aff'd per curiam 121 F. (2d)
454 (C.C.A. 2d 1941); Godfrey L. Cabot, Inc., 40 B.T.A. 366 (1939); New Orleans Cold Stor-
age & Warehouse Co., Ltd., 40 B.T.A. 121 (1939); H. H. Brown Co., 8 B.T.A. 112 (1927);
Russell Milling Co., i B.T.A. 194 (1924).
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ports income on a fiscal year basis55 the accepted accounting practice is
to apportion the local tax to the respective parts of both fiscal years falling
within the calendar year in question. 56 A taxpayer having a fiscal year
ending April 30 would allocate one-third of the 194T tax to the fiscal year
ending April 30, 1942. A "tax day" designated for administrative con-
venience in collecting the recurring exaction would not, in this connection,
appear significant. Strangely enough, however, annual taxes, instead of
being considered an expense allocable to the activity of the business con-
ducted throughout the year, have been treated as if they were significant
only during one day; taxes "accrued" on one certain day and that day
was required to bear the full burden of the annual tax.5 7 Where the
amount of the tax remains the same from year to year this makes little
difference, but where there is a substantial fluctuation in the amount of
the tax the distortion resulting from this unrealistic treatment is apparent.
Greater distortion may result when the taxing authority changes the "ac-
crual" date of the tax s8 or when the taxpayer changes his period of ac-
counting; 59 the change may result either in the loss of a deduction for a
year or in the allowance of two years' taxes in a single fiscal year. 6 ° An
even more extreme case is found in those situations where the taxpayer
either sells or purchases income producing property during the tax year.
It is here that the "tax day" idea causes the most obvious departure from
customary practice; regardless of the length of time the property is held
during the year the full amount of the tax may be deducted by the person
owning the property on the day the tax "accrued." The fortuitous word-
ing of a local tax statute has been permitted to override the congressional
mandate that the method of accounting shall "dearly reflect the income"''
of the taxpayer. Attention has been directed toward the intricacies of
local tax law162 rather than toward the problem of ascertaining annual
'55 Com'r v. Patrick Cudahy Family Co., 102 F. (2d) 930 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
z56 Cochran, Accounting for Property Taxes, I6 Tax Mag. 656 (1938); Lawrence, Cost
Accounting 181-82 (rev. ed. 1937); Burton, Introduction to Cost Accounting 5so-5i (1936);
Willcox, Cost Accounting 147-49 (1934); Armstrong, Essentials of Industrial Costing 71
(1921); Accounting Research Bulletin No. io, Real and Personal Property Taxes, 72 J. of
Accountancy 55 (1942).
157 For example, lim. 52oo, at § 6, 1941-3 C.C.H. Fed. Tax Serv. 6424.
'58 Nat'l Casket Co., 29 B.T.A. 139 (1933); I. T. 3374, 1940 - 1 Cum. Bull. 34.
's9 Notes 133, 135, X36, and 142 supra; cf. Union Bleachery v. Com'r, 97 F. (2d) 226 (C.C.A.
4 th 1938) (one corporation succeeded another).
160 G.C.M. 8553, IX-2 Cum. Bull. 109 (1930); I. T. 3370, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 32; note 158
supra.
16 Int. Rev. Code § 41, 53 Stat. 24 (1939), 26 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1940).
62 Paul, Selected Studies in Federal Taxation 24 (2d series 1938).
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gain.x6 3 As a result of the present emphasis upon local law it has been im-
possible to achieve any degree of uniformity. The time and manner in
which each particular type of tax is assessed, levied, and collected may
vary widely, not only from state to state, but also among taxing authori-
ties within a state. With more than 15o,ooo taxing units in the United
States 6 4 laying an increasing variety of exactions, the bulk of administra-
tive detail pertaining to the specific day each tax is to be deducted may
easily become as unmanageable as it is unnecessary. To a person on an
accrual basis the fiscal year of the taxing authority should furnish a suffi-
cient guide to the solution of the problem of attaching annual taxes to
business activity. 6s
If "taxes" are eliminated as a separate deduction, there would be no
occasion to continue the arbitrary restrictions which have failed to per-
form that function for which, perhaps, they were originally intended-the
accurate reflection of income. Even though this objective may be attained
through decisions like those represented by Supplee v. Magruder,"'66 the
legislative action would be more than justified. Both the elimination of
non-business taxes as a deduction and the deferment of taxes which repre-
sent capital expenditures are necessary if annual gain is to be computed in
a reasonably accurate fashion.16 This increase in accuracy will not only
provide a more equitable income tax base but will also yield an appre-
ciable increase in revenue.'68 While both results are of consequence during
ordinary years, they become immeasurably more important during a time
of soaring rates and unprecedented demands for revenue.
x
6 Helvering v. Schimmel, 114 F. (2d) 554 (C.C.A. 8th i94o), amply illustrates the
effect of contidering these conflicting guides. The statement of the general principle was
excellent, but its application was far from satisfactory. Compare United States Trust Co.,
13 B.T.A. 1074 (1928), and O.D. 371, 2 Cum. Bull. 112 (1920), with A.R.R. 1153, 1-2 CuM.
Bull. 92 (1922).
164 U.S. Taxes, 16 Fortune No. 6, at 107 (i937).
265 Thayer, Taxes as Deferred Debits, x8 J. of Accountancy 114, 117 (1914).
'66 36 F. Supp. 722 (Md. 194I), aff'd 123 F. (2d) 399 (C.C.A. 4 th 1941), cert. granted
ro U.S.L. Week 3283 (1942).
x67 Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure 352 (1917). See also Paul, The Emergency Job of
Federal Taxation, 27 Cornell L.Q. 3, 19 (1941); Seligman, The Income Tax 684 (2d ed.
1914).
6S See op. cit. supra note 64, at 3 n. io.
